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THE GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATUTE
On April 16, 1677, Charles II, by the Grace of God, King
of England, Scotland, Ireland and France, gave his royal assent
to three bills, one of which was the famous Statute of Frauds.
For several years the Houses of Parliament, guided by the flower
of England's jurists, had deliberated over its provisions. In its
finished state, the statute was the product of the combined author-
ship of Lord Guilford, Sir Matthew Hale, Lord Nottingham,
Lord North, Sir Leoline Jenkins and a number of lesser celebrities.
It was entitled as "An act for prevention of frauds and per-
juries" and at its birth it doubtless merited its title.' Without
going into particulars as to its scope it may be noted that the
statute provided that: I. No interest in lands, except leases not
exceeding three years, could be created or surrendered except by
writing. II. Signed memoranda were required: (a) to validate
promises, of an executor or administrator to answer for damages
out of his personal estate, or (b) of a person to pay the debt of
another; (c) to enforce fulfillment of contracts made on con-
sideration of marriage, or (d) of executory contracts for the
sale of lands; and (e) to enforce performance of contracts that
could not be executed within the year. III. Creation or assign-
ment of trusts in land were void unless evidenced by a writing, or
were created by operation of law. IV. Contracts for the sale of
goods of a greater value than ten pounds were not enforceable
unless the contracting parties signed memoranda of the contract
129 CAR. II c. 3 (1677). See 8 PICKERING, STATUTES AT LARGE (1676)
405. Also see Costigan, Date and Authorship of the Statute of Frauds (1913)
26 HARv. L. REV. 329, and Costigan, Interpretation of the Statute of Frauds
(919) 14 ILIL L. REv. I for very interesting accounts of its date and author-
ship. Also Hening, The Original Drafts of the Statute of Frauds and Their
Authors (1913) 61 U. oF PA. L. REV. 283, where photographic copies of the
original statutes are compared with excerpts from the letters of the various
authors. (1927) 100 CENT. L. . 171 has an editorial note on the conclusiveness
of Professor Costigan's research on the date of the statute.
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or partly performed it.2 When passed, the statute consisted of
twenty-five sections, but historical development and later statutes
have made certain sections, such as the wills provisions, of interest
only when studying early cases.3 The eight sections summarized
above have been re-enacted, with minor modifications, virtually
everywhere in the United States.
The purpose of the statute is quite apparent, but it must be
remembered that conditions in 1677 were different from those of
today. In the first place contract law was in its embryonic stages
and but little understood. Trial by jury was even more imperfect
than now; there were no rules of evidence to speak of, and parties
to the suit were not allowed to testify on their own behalf.4 It
can readily be seen that, under such circumstances, it was of para-
mount importance to have written evidence of contracts, else a
plaintiff could come into court and have a friend testify to a
feigned contract, which a defendant would be powerless to dis-
prove by his own testimony. Also there was a great fear of the
uncontrolled power of the juries, accentuated by the decision in
Bushell's case.5 But it is a far cry from 1677 to 193o and there
is a steadily growing opinion that the statute has outlived its
'For more complete summaries see: SMITH, THE LAW or FRAUDS (1907)
328; 6 HOLDSWORTH, HIsToRY oF ENGLISH LAW (3d ed. 1924) 384; 1 WIwLIs-
TON, CONTACcrs (1920) § 449.
3The Statute of Victoria, known as the Wills Act, 7 WM. IV AND I Vicr.
c. 26, §§ 1-3, 6-35 (1837) superseded the several testamentary provisions of the
Statute of Frauds, except in the minority of states that base their respective
wills acts on the Statute of Frauds and not on the Statute of Victoria. In the
summary (I) equals §§I, 2, 3; (II) § 4; (III) §§ 7, 8, 9; (IV) § 17. As the
trust provisions involve other problems, little will be said about them. In the
main, injustice has been prevented by the application of the doctrine of resulting
and constructive trusts arising by operation of law, where an express trust would
be bad, so that resort to cstoppel is unnecessary. For discussion of the subject
see Scott, Conveyances upon Trusts not Properly Declared (924) 37 HRV. L.
REv. 653; Scott, Resulting Trusts Arishg upon the Purchase of Land (1927) 40
HARv. L. REv. 669; Costigan, Trusts Based on Oral Promises to Hold in Trist,
to Convey, or to Devise, Made by Voluntary Gran tees (1914) 12 MICH. L. REv.
427, 515. Only very occasionally as in the case of Griffin v. Schlenk, 31 Ky. 422,
1O2 S. W. 837 (19o7) is the doctrine of estoppel invoked as well. See note
(1922) 22 CoL- L. Rav. 64.
'Berger, Section Seventeen in the Light of Two ald a Half Centuries
(1928) 13 CoRN. L. Q. 303. Also 6 HouLswoRrH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 388.
I Vaughan 135 (i67o) ; I HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 344. This
case decided that control of the jury by fine or imprisonment was illegal. See
also 6 HOLDSWoRTH, loc. cit. supra note 4.
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usefulness and should be repealed.' As early as 1885, Sir Fred-
erick Pollock and Justice Stephens commenting on section seven-
teen said:
"The special peculiarity of . . . the Statute of Frauds
is that it is in the nature of things impossible that it ever
should have any operation, except that of enabling a man to
escape from the discussion of the question whether he has or
has not been guilty of a deliberate fraud by breaking his
word." '
How many unjust suits have been prevented as a result of
the statute cannot be estimated, but the reports are filled with
cases where just claims have been defeated by its operation. This
has resulted in a distorting of the statute, in order to prevent
injustice, into the most inconceivable meanings, so that cases
might be ruled to fall without its provisions. One writer points
out that "under the heading of the Statute of Frauds, the Cen-
tury Digest has digested approximately 63oo cases, the first de-
cennial approximately 2200 and the second decennial approxi-
mately 2300. Of this it is estimated that less than one-third
were held to be within the statute." s Worse still, this hetero-
geneous mass of cases has cost a tremendous sum to litigate,0
and even then the decisions are self-contradictory and conflicting."'
d* ".. . the prevailing feeling both in the legal and commercial world is,
and has for a long time been, that these clauses have outlived their usefulness,
and are quite out of place amid the changed legal and commercial conditions of
today." i HoLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 396. For criticisms of the
statute see Sir Frederick Pollock and Justice Stephens, Section Seventeen of the
Statute of Frauds (1885) I L. Q. Ruv. i; Berger, op. cit. supra, note 4; Bur-
dick, A Statute for Promoting Fraud (1916) 16 CoL. L. REv. 273; Willis, The
Statute of Frauds-A Legal Anachronism (1928) 3 IND. L. J. 427, 528. Coutra.
see Lilienthal, Judicial Repeal of the Statute of Frauds (i896) 9 HARv. L. REv.
455; Betts, Is the Statute of Frauds Abolished? (192o) 56 CAN. L. J. 161;
BAKER, SALES AS AFFECTED BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS (1887) C. I.
' Pollock and Stephens, op. cit. supra note 6, at 3. The authors conclude
by advising the repeal of the seventeenth section and point out that among the
merchants of Liverpool it is tacitly ignored.
' Willis, op. cit. supra note 6, at 537.
Chancellor Kent put the sum at over $ioooooo in his time.
' "There is no other statute that has been the source of so much litigation.
The decisions in the same state lack uniformity and are contradictory. The law
On the Statute of Frauds is many cases chaotic and unsettled. The statute it-
self is clear and explicit, seldom requiring construction, but its application is
the occasion of the greatest disorder and uncertainty." SMITH, op. cit. supra
note 2, at 327. Federal Courts do not clarify the situation by laying down a
uniform rule because they are bound by the various state interprLtations: Inter-
state Co. v. Bry Block Mercantile Co., 30 F. (2d) 172 (W. D. Tenn. 1928).
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It is quite true that hard cases make bad law, but the converse,
that bad law makes hard cases, is equally correct. The statute
seems to illustrate the tendency of Anglo-American jurisprudence
to enact a law, find it unsatisfactory, for the most part give it
lip-service, but in reality either deliberately ignore it or find
unwarranted exceptions to it."
COURTS OF EQUITY AND COURTS OF LAW
Further complications arise because the statute does not re-
ceive the same treatment in the hands of an equity court as it
does in the hands of a law court, although it has been repeatedly
affirmed that it is as binding on one as on the other. To be sure,
both courts allow a quasi-contractual action to recover for bene-
fits conferred under an unenforceable or voidable contract, 12 but
that is done to prevent unjust enrichment and not because of the
contract. It is true that the contract may be used in evidence
to evaluate benefits but this should not mislead one into thinking
that it is enforced, even though a coincidence should make the
quasi-contractual recovery exactly the same as recovery on the
contract would have been.',
Up to the present the law courts have refused to
enforce parol contracts within the scope of the Statute of
" Speaking of the American Political Mind, Mr. Walter Lippman says: "In
legalism it found a tested body of rules from which new rules could be spun
without the labor of learning new truths from experience. The formula became
so curiously sacred that every good foreign observer has been amazed at the
contrast between the dynamic practical energy of the American people, and the
static theorism of their public life." PUBLIC OPINION 274.
"a The words "unenforceable or voidable" are used with premeditation. The
English cases established that parol contracts under the statute were unenforce-
able and not void, and all the text writers agree that this is the correct interpre-
tation: I WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 527; 25 R. C. L. 692 (ipig). How-
ever, Alabama, Colorado, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Utah, Wisconsin and Wyoming have complicated the question by insert-
ing the word "void" in their respective statutes. But even then it is questionable
if, in view of the historical background, voidable is not really meant. I WIL-
1.ISTON, ibid. § 531. Whether a contract is considered unenforceable or voidable
Is quite immaterial, as the results will be identical. So there is no practical dif-
ference between calling a contract unenforceable or voidable. But it must be
remembered that a minority of decisions give effect to the word "void" in its
full sense.
" As to this whole question, see WOODWARD, THE LAw OF QUASI CONTRACTS
(1913) 144-172.
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Frauds,1 4 whereas equity courts have lent their aid in enforc-
ing such contracts if the elements of fraud, part performance
or estoppel were present. In the fraud cases the contract is
enforced under the maxim that it is the supreme duty of the
courts of equity to prevent fraud, and by enforcing the contract
they reach this laudable result. Theoretically, in such cases "re-
lief is afforded in equity because of the fraud and not by virtue
of the contract". 15 An even better established basis of relief
against the operation of the statute is afforded by the doctrine
of part performance. This is not, as has been urged,"6 in contra-
" However it is questionable if the application of the doctrine of estoppel to
validate contracts unenforceatle under the Statute of Frauds is limited to courts
of equity. It is true that in the case of Hayes v. Livingston, 34 Mich. 384
(1876) a law court refused to recognize such a plea, but that decision was made
in 1876 and since then there has been an apparent change in the attitude of the
courts. See note 48 L. R. A. (N. s.) 774 (1914) commenting on this transition.
See also the case of Hamburger v. Hirsch, 212 S. W. 49 (Mo. App. i9i9). It
is possible that a distinction may be drawn between estoppels affecting title to
land and those that do not which would reconcile the decision in Hayes v.
Livingston, supra. See Joy v. Godchaux, 35 F. (2d) 649 (C. C. A. 8th, x929).
The matter is very greatly complicated by the fact that some states following
the reformed procedure of New York have merged their courts of law and
equity, some while retaining the distinction between their courts have allowed
the pleading of equitable defences to legal actions, while still a third group has
retained all or virtually all of the old distinctions. In the first group the lan-
guage of the court in Zellner v. Wassman ct al., 184 Cal. 8o, 193 Pac. 84 (192o)
would seem to imply that no difficulties should arise. They say, at 85, 193 Pac.
at 86: "Where the administration of law and equity has been merged into one
court this doctrine of equitable estoppel is not confined to suits it equity but is
equally applicable in an action at law." So, theoretically speaking, it should not
matter whether the courts considered estoppel as a legal or as an equitable plea,
because it would be given the same consideration under either nomenclature. How-
ever, see Clark, The Code Cause of Action. (924) 33 YAL. L. J. 817 as to the
delusive simplicity of the reformed procedure. In the second class of cases, if
the courts consider estoppel as a legal plea there is no difficulty. But if they
consider it as equitable, there is difficulty, because estoppel almost invariably in
this type of case is not, strictly speaking, a defence, but is pleaded in the repli-
cation as a basis for the cause of action. And by the case of. Union Pacific Ry.
Co. v. Says, 246 Fed. 561, (C. C. A. 8th, 1917) an equitable plea may not be so
pleaded. See, as to this, McBaine, Equitable Defences to Actions at Law in the
Federal Courts (1929) 17 CALIF. L. Rav. 591. In the jurisdictions of the third
class, the plea must be considered as a legal one before it can attain any standing
whatever in the law courts. For a classification of the states into the three
above-mentioned groups see 21 C. J. (i9zo) 24. The whole question seems to
be in a period of transition, the ultimate result of which will probably be that
the plea of estoppel against the Statute of Frauds will have complete recognition
at the hands of a law court. As to the present relations of law and equity, see
I PomERoy, EQUITY JIRISDICTION' (4th ed. 1918) §§ 68-88.
'Wakeman v. Dodd, 27 N. J. Eq. 564 (1876).
', Lilienthal, op. cit. supra note 6. Tennessee, North Carolina, Kentucky,
and Mississippi refuse to follow the doctrine.
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vention of the true meaning of the statute, for, as Prof. Costigan
points out:
"The statute framers were thoroughly familiar with the
part performance problem, and the decisions which shortly
after the Statute of Frauds settled the law that part perform-
ance would make the oral contract for the sale of land en-
forceable in chancery, notwithstanding the statute, are con-
clusive evidence that its framers never intended the statute to
prevent the giving of relief in part performance." 1-
In contracts involving land interests it is generally sufficient if
the vendee has taken possession of the land in question.' s It has
been said that "the doctrine of part performance applies exclu-
sively to contracts for the sale of lands". 19 This is not absolutely
true and must be qualified. The dicta of certain courts would
seem to show that they recognize part performance as validating
other contracts as well.
21
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL
It can readily be seen that equitable relief in cases in-
volving fraud or part performance prevents a great amount
of injustice. Nevertheless it is just as obvious that in many
cases, where both elements are lacking, a party may, in reliance on
the validity of the oral contract, so far change his position that
'1 Costigan, 26 HARuv. L. REv. 329, tprCa note I. There is a fuller discus-
sion of the subject in another connection on page , note 68 infra.
" See Az.es, CASES IN EQUITY JURISDICTION (1904) 274-316 for a collection
of cases on the subject rf equitable enforcement of parol contracts within the
Statute of Frauds. Also BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS (5th ed. 1895) 557-621.
The utmost that is required to invoke the doctrine of part performance is "pay-
ment according to contract, delivery of possession and permanent valuable im-
provements". Edwards v. Old Settlers Association, 166 S. W. 423 (Tex. 1914).
By the case of Neale v. Neales, 9 Wall. I (U. S. 1869) it was held that: "Equity
protects a parol gift of land equally with a parol agreement to sell it, if accom-
panied by possession and the donee induced by the promise to give has made
valuable improvements on it."
191 WILLISTON, op. cit. supra note 2, § 533.
'Seymour v. Oelrichs, 156 Cal. 782, 1O6 Pac. 88 (191o). The English law
on the subject is that "the doctrine of part performance is not confined to those
cases which come within the Statute of Frauds because they relate to land, but.
on the contrary, extends to every case in which a suit for specific performance
of the contract can be maintained and parol evidence is admissible to ground an
action where there has been such part performance". 34 IRIS LAw TIMES
330, Aug. ii, igoo.
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he will suffer great loss if the contract is not enforced against
the other contractor. In such cases the invocation of the statute
would allow the perpetration of a moral fraud. It cannot be
too strongly insisted that there is a difference between this moral
fraud and the legal fraud against which a court of equity has
always given relief. For the latter there must be an antecedent
intent to deceive, perpetrated through the ignorance or gullibility
of the victim, or through the false representation to him that a
memorandum to satisfy the statute has been made. On the other
hand, in moral fraud the person deceiving may never have had
an antecedent evil motive. He simply decides that for one reason
or another, he will not carry out the contract, despite his prior
representations that he would do so. Under such conditions the
courts of equity have granted relief under the doctrine of
equitable estoppel. Given all the elements of an estoppel in pais,
present-day courts of equity will estop a person from setting up
the statute where a moral fraud would result thereby. In other
words, they will estop him from denying the validity of a contract
voidable under the Statute of Frauds.2' A little reflection will
'21 The texts on this subject are not very helpful for the simple reason that
the latest one, by SITH, supra note 2, was published in 19o7 and the rest were
published in the last century. Since then important changes have occurred and
a great deal of water has passed under the bridges. Some, as 2 REED, THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS (1884) 69, limit estoppel to fraud fully made out. Others
ignore this question completely: THROOP, VALIDITY OF VEIMAL AGREEMENTS
(187o) and BAKER, op. cit. supra note 6. AGNEW, THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
(1876) limits estoppel to "acts of notoriety not less formal and solemn than the
execution of a deed". BROWNE, op. cit. supra note 18, deals with ,the question at
pages 584-586. The more moden rule is stated in 27 C. J. (ig22) 338, 20 Cyc.
(i9o2) 3o8 and io R. C. L. (1915) 833. The subject is touched upon in a few
case notes, among them (1922) 20 MIcH. L. REv. 356 and (1925) 74 U. OF PA.
L. REv. 192 dealing with estoppel applied to parol alterations of written contracts
within the statute, and (1922) 2 Wis. L. REV. 47 which criticizes the case of
Peavey v. Loveland, 174 Wis. 57, 182 N. W. 349 (1921) insisting, probably cor-
rectly, that the doctrine of estoppel should not apply if the parties can be put
in status quo. The Supreme Court of the United States, commenting on this
phase of the law, has said: "Where a person tacitly encourages an act to be
done, he cannot afterwards exercise his legal right in opposition to such consent,
if his conduct or acts of encouragement induced the other party to change his
position so that he will be pecuniarily prejudiced by the assertion of such adver-
sary claim." Swain v. Seamans, 9 Wall. 254, at 274 (U. S. 1869). Further
cases are cited on later pages with reference to the discussion. There are a few
cases contra, but examination will reveal that most of them are cases decided
some time ago and are not in harmony with the prevailing authority of today.
See Ala. Mineral Land Co. v. Jackson, 121 Ala. 172, 25 So. 709 (1899) ; Thomp-
son v. New South Coal Co., 135 Ala. 630, 34 So. 31 (1902) ; Percifield v. Black,
132 Ind. 384. 31 N. E. 955 (1892) ; Brightman v. Hicks, IO8 Mass. 246 (1871) ;
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show that this is justified by well-established principles. In the
first place, the part performance doctrine, long since accepted, in
the last analysis, merely works as an extension of the principles
of equitable estoppel.22  Secondly, by preventing the inequitable
use of the Statute of Frauds, the doctrine of estoppel may be an
aid in the ultimate function of the statute in preventing fraud.
Thirdly, as one court points out: 23
"The doctrine of estoppel is as old as the Statute of
Frauds, and, as such, a part of the law of the land. It is no
objection to either, that the one may be a modification or
regulation of the other."
Fourthly, courts of equity have always protected a person
from the harsh operations of statutes. For instance, a person
will not be allowed to set up the Statute of Limitations if he has
induced the belief that it would not be invoked.24  Especially is
this true today. In the past century the courts, influenced by the
historical and analytical schools of jurisprudence, became hard
and mechanical. This spirit was reflected in the courts of equity
with the lamentable result of their losing much, both in influence
and in the power of doing good.23 So marked was this tendency
that Dean Pound, writing at the beginning of this century, entitled
Hayes v. Livingston, supra note 14. Moreover it is possible that some of these
cases, although in apparent contradiction, could be justified on the facts. For
instance Hayes v. Livingston, supra, is a law and not an equity decision, and if
estoppel is considered as an equitable plea the decision is technically correct.
The cases may be found collected in 27 C. J., szpra, and in the 13 THIRD DEC.
Dir. (i9-08) Topic, Frauds, Statute of, Key Nos. 144 and iig (2).
22 TIFFANY, REAL PROPFRTY (2d ed. i92o) 2i4o and 1208-1215. In many
cases the elements of part performance and estoppel are both present and it
becomes exceedingly hard to determine on which of the giounds the court
decided the case.
'Taylor v. Zepp, 14 Mo. 482, 491 (i85I).
-" (1928) 37 YALE L. J. 547.
'Dickens in "Bleak House" gives this description of a court of chancery:
"This is the Court of Chancery; which has its decaying houses and its blighted
lands in every shire; which has its worn out lunatic in every madhouse, and its
dead in every churchyard; which has its ruined suitor with his slipshod heels
and threadbare dress, borrowing and begging through the round of every man's
acquaintance; which gives to monied might, the means abundantly of wearing
out the right; which so exhausts finances, patience, hope; so overthrows the
brain and breaks the heart that there is not an honorable man among its practi-
tioners who would not give-who does not often give-the warning 'Suffer any
wrong that can be done you, rather than come here'."
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an article "The Decadence of Equity". 26 But the analytical and
historical schools of the past century have given way to the philo-
sophical and sociological schools of the present and morality has
re-asserted itself in the law.2 7  So it is quite in keeping with
modem tendencies to avoid too literal interpretations of statutes
leading to harsh results.
In connection with this subject, two types of contracts must
be considered: primary oral contracts within the statute; and
modifications of primary written contracts within the statute.
In the latter case, a new contract, a contract to modify, is created. 28
As the problems that arise from reliance on the primary oral
contract and on the oral contract to modify are substantially the
same, the same principles apply and they shall be discussed to-
gether for the most part.
In entering these contracts, the principal reasons that parties
may not have fulfilled the statutory requirements are as follows:
I. Ignorance by either or both of the parties of the existence of
the statute, or that the contract in question fell within its provi-
sions. II. Bona fide belief that a memorandum made to satisfy
the statute was sufficient when in reality it is insufficient. III.
Reliance on an oral promise to put the oral contract into writing
at some subsequent date.2" IV. Reliance on a waiver of the
defense of the statute.
It has been already stated that present-day courts are practi-
cally unanimous in applying estoppel to validate contracts unen-
forceable under the Statute of Frauds. Though most of the cases
that have arisen deal with land contracts, the courts will not limit
themselves to these agreements but will apply the doctrine to any
(I905) 5 COL- L. REV. 20.
= If anyone doubts that morality is part of the law, let him read Dean
Pound's book LAW AND MORALS (I915). Incidentally, a very good discussion
of the shift from the analytical and historical methods to those of today is
found in this volume.
' "It then stands as a new agreement, wherein the mutual promises furnish
a good consideration", Clark et al. v. Dales, et al., 2o Barb. 42, at 64 (N. Y.
1855).
' As a general rule courts will not allow the enforcement of the oral
promise to put the oral contract into writing, for that would in effect be vali-
dating the oral contract. See I WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 2, § 524 a.
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contract under the statute.30 The crux of the problem presented
is to reconcile the decisions of the courts as to what constitutes
a sufficient estoppel to take the case out of the statute; many
decisions are quite irreconcilable. In some states the courts have
admitted the principle, but have been so strict in its application
that the doctrine has little practical efficacy. It has been said:
".... the mere fact that one acts on an oral promise hop-
ing that it will be carried out by the promisor does not estop
the latter. So as a general rule the mere omission coupled
with performance, is insufficient to create an estoppel. The
refusal to carry out a promnise to put a contract in writing is
not such fraud as takes the case out of the statute and this
is ordinarily true, even when the party relying simply on the
word favor or promise of another has changed his position
to his injury on account of it. In all these cases, however,
there must be to avoid an estoppel an absence of actual
fraud." 31
Besides, if the parties can be put in statu quo, it is doubtful if the
courts would apply estoppel.32  From this it may be seen that it
is of the utmost importance to ascertain the elements of an estoppel.
Professor Pomeroy has found that a proper estoppel consists of
six elements. 33
THE ELEMENTS OF AN ESTOPPEL
An examination of the elements separately should prove
fruitful. However, the first three are so correlated that they may
be considered together:
"I. There must be conduct, acts, language or silence
amounting to a representation 34 or concealment of material
0 Seymour v. Oelrichs, supra note 20.
' Quoted in Little v. Union Oil Co. of California, 23 Cal. App. 612, 621, 238
Pac. io66, IO69 (1925) giving the rule as stated in 12 CAL. JURISPRUDENCE § 104,
Statute of Frauds. This is not a statutory change but is merely declaratory of
the common law.
'See (1922) 2 Wis. L. REV. 47.
W2 Po 0tmoy, p. cit. supra note 14, § 8o5. However: "It would be unsafe
and misleading to rely on the general requisites as applicable to every case with-
out examining the instances in which they have been modified or limited."
r, Query: Did not Prof. Pomeroy mean misrepresentation?
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facts. II. These facts must be known to the party estopped
at the time of his said conduct or at least the circumstances
must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily imputed
to him. III. The truth concerning these facts must be un-
known to the other party claiming benefit of the estoppel at
the time when such conduct was done and at the time when
it was acted upon by him."
A very clear case that instantly comes to mind is where there
is a misrepresentation of certain facts, which if true, would cause
the contract to fall without the statute. Thus if A tells B that
he will pay C's debts, and says that he has property belonging to C
in his hands, A will be estopped to deny that he has assets of C's
with which to pay C's debts. On such facts the statute will not
apply.3" Of course, if A intended to mislead B, relief should be
granted on the ground of fraud, but it is quite conceivable that A
was merely careless in supposing that certain assets he possessed
were C's and may never have had any fraudulent intent.
3 6
Where both parties are cognizant of the existence of the
statute and knowingly waive its benefit a true estoppel is created,
for it comes within the well established exception that waiver of
an existing right on which waiver another party relies gives rise
to an estoppel. The "existing right" is the right to have the con-
tract put into writing before it can be considered binding.37  It
does not matter whether the contract is considered void, voidable
' Dock v. Boyd & Co., 93 Pa. 92 (i88o).
'Likewise a person is estopped to deny the authority of his agent whose
appointment was invalid under the Statute of Frauds: Karns v. Olney, 8o Cal.
90, 22 Pac. 57 (1889); Brenneman v. Lane, 87 Cal. App. 414, 262 Pac. 400
(1927).
""Contracts within the Statute of Frauds are not void but only voidable at
the election of the party to be charged. He may waive the necessity of the
writing required by the statute and thereby make the contract binding." St.
Louis K. and N. W. Ry. Co. v. Clark, 121 Mo. 169, 186,25 S.W. 192, 196 (i893),
26 L. R. A. 751 (1894). Also "A plaintiff . . . must be able to show clearly
such acts and conduct of the defendant as the court would hold to amount to a
representation that he proposed to stand by his agreement and not avail himself
of the statute to escape his performance and also that the plaintiff in reliance on
this representation proceeded either in performance or pursuance of his con-
tract, to so far alter his position as to incur an unjust and unconscientious injury
and loss in case the defendant is permitted after all to rely upon the statutory
defence." BROWNE, op. cit. supra note 21, at 585, quoted with approval in Zell-
ner v. Wassman et al., supra note 14, at 87, 193 Pac. at 87.
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or unenforceable for the right that is waived is the same under
any one of the three views.
38
A more difficult problem arises where there has been a parol
modification of a written contract within the Statute of Frauds.
As has been shown a new contract is created, but it is likely that
in its creation a right under the existing contract has been modified
or abandoned. If this modification or abandonment is relied upon
it would be highly inequitable to permit the setting up of the
statute to invalidate the second contract.39 Thus an example
would be where B grants A a parol extension of a lease during
which A may give notice to terminate. A relies on this waiver
of an existing right, i. e., to have notice of termination within
a certain day, and thereafter B is estopped to deny the validity
of the new contract granting the extension.
40
But there may be another type of case in which none, or vir-
tually none, of the rights under the old contract is abandoned.
the parol modification calling instead for further performance of
a positive nature. In that case the waiver of an existing right
theory should not apply and if an estoppel be pleaded, it should
be supported, if supported at all, on other grounds.
There seems to be no reason why estoppel should not be
applied where the party to be estopped knew of the existence of the
'However, see note (19o6) 19 HARv. L. RFv. 455 where, in a discussion of
the effects of estoppel on void contracts, the author says: "As a general rule
there seems to be no goad reason for allowing estoppel to make valid a void
contract." The cases of Ala. Mineral Land Co. v. Jackson, and Thompson v.
New South Coal Co., both supra 21, and note 62 L. R. A. 551 (19o3) are in
accord with this statement. They refuse to apply estoppel on the ground that as
the contract was void in its literal sense, there was a mere nullity on which an
estoppel could not operate. But there is such an overwhelming number of cases
holding the other way which allow estoppel to operate on contracts considered
void, that this position is hardly tenable. See for instance, the case of Dobbs
v. Atlas Elevator Co., 25 S. D. 177, 126 N. W. 250 (910).
"Where a representation as to the future relates to an intended abandon-
ment of an existing right and is made to influence others and they have been
influenced by it to act, it operates as an estoppel." Kingston v. Walters, I6
N. M. 59, 64, 113 Pac. 594, 595 (1911). See also Daniels v. Rogers et al., loS
App. Div. 338, 96 N. Y. Supp. 642 (19o5) ; Scott v. Hubbard, 67 Ore. 498, 136
Pac. 653 (1913) ; Rogers v. Maloney, 85 Ore. 61, i65 Pac. 357 (1917). There
is an annotation to Kingsley v. Kressly, 6o Ore. 167, 118 Pac. 678 (1911) in
ANN. CAS. 1913 E 746, which deals with this type of case.
'Hamburger v. Hirsch et al., supra note 14.
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statute and the other party did not.41  Certainly it is most
unconscientious for one person deliberately to take advantage of
the ignorance of another by inducing him to enter into a contract
which he knows full well is not enforceable against himself. The
misrepresentation of "fact" is then the implied statement that
the contract was binding when in reality it was not. Of course
this is really a misrepresentation of law and not of fact but since
the celebrated case of Storrs v. Barker,4 2 misrepresentations of
law have also given rise to estoppels.
It cannot be questioned that legal fraud creates an estoppel
against the Statute of Frauds. On theory this would seem rather
needless as fraud in itself is a sufficient reply against the plea
of the statute without resort to estoppel, but practically it does
no harm.4 5
While there may be other cases and examples not covered in
the above classification, those enumerated embrace, in the main,
that class of cases where there is little doubt that if an estoppel
be properly pleaded 44 and the other elements are present, the
SThough the following statement was not made about the Statute of
Frauds it is nevertheless apropos: "It is generally stated as the settled rule that
estoppel cannot be found upon a misrepresentation of law. . . The basis of
this rule is that everyone is presumed to know the law, or that statement of the
law can only be an opinion. However, an exception to the rule is recognized
when the person making the statement is in a particularly good position to know
the law. A fortiori, a further exception to the general rule seems proper,
where, as in this case the misrepresentation by a person who knows the law is
made to a person clearly not knowing the law. A statement of law should not
be called an opinion when made and acted upon as a fact." (917) 31 HARv. L.
Ray. 655.
"6 Johns. 166 (N. Y. i8z2).
Hedges & Co. v. Howard, 5 R. I. 149 (1858) ; BIGELOW, ESTOPPEL (6th ed.
1913) 782: "Indeed the ground upon which equity treats the case as out of the
Statute of Frauds, to wit, the fraud of the person to be estopped should be suffi-
cient to justify a court of law in acting. The ground of an estoppel by conduct
commonly is fraud and it cannot be that a statute made to prevent the accom-
plishment of fraud should stand in the way, preventing such a result in any
court." Ordinarily legal fraud is not necessary to create an estoppel. In the
case of Anderson v. Hubble, 93 Ind. 57o, at 577 (1883) it was said: "All that
is meant in the expression that an estoppel must possess an element of fraud is
that the case must be one in which the circumstances and conduct would render
it a fraud for the party to deny what he had previously induced or suffered
another to take action upon . There need be no precedent corrupt motive
or evil design."
" The court in Rheingans v. Smith, i6i Cal. 362 at 366, I119 Pac. 494, at 496
(1911) said: "It has occurred to the court that defendant might be estopped to
assert rights under his contract upon the principles stated in Seymour v. Oel-
richs." But as the other party did not urge it, the court did not interpose on
their own initiative. Seymour v. Oelrichs, supra note 20, is discussed in the fol-
lowing paragraph.
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court will uphold the plea, and be satisfied that it is perfectly con-
sistent with established legal principles. It has seemed unneces-
sary to dwell on elements II and III because it is obvious beyond
need of discussion that the fact, the intent to abide by the waiver,
and the fraudulent intent were or should have been known to the
party against whom the estoppel operates, and were unknown to
the one setting it up.
A very important question, as to the applicability of estoppel,
that must be treated by itself arises where one person has relied on
the promise of another to put the contract into writing at some
subsequent date. If the promise was made with the intent of
influencing the other contracting party, the case falls within the
principles of Seymour v. Oelrichs,45 an able decision of the
California Supreme Court. In that case, plaintiff was captain on
the police force, assured of a life position at $250 a month. De-
fendants, through their agents, urged him to accept a position as
manager of their estates at $300 a month for a period of ten years.
He was urged to resign his position and begin work at once and
was told that the contract would be put into writing at a con-
venient later date. Accordingingly he did resign and commenced
his employment, but after two years defendants repudiated the
contract. The court held that they were estopped to deny its
existence. In its decision the court admitted that it was difficult
to say a material fact was misrepresented; but to show that such a
statement could be made, quoted from Prof. Pomeroy:
"A representation of a future intention, absolute in
form, deliberately made for the purpose of influencing the
conduct of the other party and then acted upon by him, is
generally the source of a right and may amount to a contract
enforceable as such by a court of equity." 46
There can be no quarrel with the eminent justice of this decision,
but it must be confessed that it is not universally followed. 47
'" Supra note 20.
'1 2 PoMEROY, op. cit. supra note 14, § 877 n.
' See Nehls et at. v. Williams Stock Farming Co., 43 Nev. 253, 184 Pac.
212 (i919) ; reaff'd: 185 Pac. 563 (igi), where the Nevada Court declined to
say whether it would have followed Seymour v. Oelrichs, supra note 20, if the
facts had been the same.
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However, it might have been better had the court called it
a promissory estoppel because at bottom the fact is not there.
4S
It is true that promissory estoppels have been recognized some-
what diffidently and then mostly in the cases of charitable subscrip-
tions where consideration is lacking,49 but that is no reason
why this principle should not be extended to promote justice in
just such a case as this. Certainly it is in accord with what Dean
Pound has described as "the perennial movement in the law
toward a fuller and wider securing of interests and hence towards
a wider and fuller enforcement of promises". 50
The next question presents a very labyrinth of problems.
There are many cases where parties materially change their posi-
tion on the mistaken assumption that the unenforceable contract
was binding which assumption was induced either by the ignorance
of the existence of the statute, a mistaken belief that it did not
apply, or else through a misapprehension as to what memoran-
dum was required. Relief has been given on the grounds of
estoppel in numerous decisions. 51 Other courts have denied relief
on the ground that at most it is an oral promise.12  The court
in Dechenbach v. Rina 53 quotes the following statement:
'Especially as the quotation from Pomeroy is taken from a chapter on
fraud and the court had specifically denied the existence of any fraud.
"I WILoSTO7q, op. Cit. supra note 2, § 139.
Pound, Consideration in Equity (1918) 13 ILL. L. REV. 667, at 679.
m Ala. G. S. R. R. Co. v. S. and N. Ala. R. R. Co., 84 Ala. 570 (1887);
Price v. Thompson, 4 Ga. App. 46, 6o S. E. 8oo (19o8) ; Cross v. Weare Com-
mission Co., 153 Ill. 499, 38 N. E. 1038 (1894) ; Hartz et al. v. Kales Realty
Co., 178 Mich. 56o, 146 N. W. 16o (1914); Thompson v. Hurson et aL, 2O
Mich. 685, 167 N. W. 926 (1918); Munsch v. Stetler, iop Minn. 4o3, 124 N. W.
14 (191o) ; Delta Lumber Co. v. Wall, 119 Miss. 350, 8o So. 782 (1919) ; Taylor
v. Zepp, supra note 23; Dwight et al. v. Williams et al., 25 Misc. 667, 55 N. Y.
Supp. 201 (I8) ; First National Bank v. LaFayette Trust Co., 85 Misc. 341,
148 N. Y. Supp. 491 (1914) ; Dobbs v. Atlas Elevator Co., 25 S. D. 177, 126
N. W. 250 (191o) ; Hand v. Nix ct Ux., 39 Tex. Civ. App. 403, 87 S. W. 204
(19o5) ; O'Connor et ux. v. Oliver et al., 45 Wash. 549, 88 Pac. 1O25 (1907) ;
Tufts v. Copen, 37 W. Va. 623, 16 S. E. 793 (1893). However it must be con-
fessed that some of these cases may belong in the "waiver of the benefit of the
statute" or other categories. As a general rule estoppel is applied without much
discussion as to what elements are present so that classifying the cases is not
always easy.
I Miller v. Hart, 122 Ky. 494, 91 S. W. 698 (19o6) ; Nehls et al. v. Williams
Stock Farming Co., supra note 47; Robbins v. Winters et al., 203 S. W. 149
(Mo. App. 1918).
Z345 Ore. 500, 5o6, 78 Pac. 666, 668 (19o4).
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"That a party was ignorant of the law, or that he con-
fided in the promise of another, and acted upon it to his
disadvantage, has never been held to be an answer to the
statute."
If it is admitted that there can never be an estoppel unless every
element is present, there is no question that Dechenbach v. Rima
reaches a substantially correct result, because one of the elements,
namely the third, is missing.5 4 The misrepresented fact, or in
this case law, is supplied by the implied statement that the con-
tract is legally binding when in reality it is not. As ignorance of
the law is not deemed an excuse, the person estopped must admit
that knowledge of the law is necessarily imputed to him.55 But
the same is true of the person setting up the estoppel so that he
cannot claim that he was acting in ignorance of the true state of
the law. In those cases already mentioned where a misrepresenta-
tion of law has given rise to an estoppel it has been a misrepresen-
tation of law operating on particular facts and not a misrepresenta-
tion of the general scope of law or of a law. So it would be erron-
eous to say that Storrs v. Barker and analogous decisions are prece-
dents for the Statute of Frauds cases.56 Nor can it be said that,
as neither party can plead ignorance of the law, if they continued
with the contract an implied waiver of the Statute of Frauds
exists, because a waiver can apply only to known rights.
But under such reasoning a person is able to set up the Stat-
ute of Frauds as a mere excuse for not performing a contract
which at one time he himself was quite willing to perform. The
" "The truth concerning these facts must be unknown to the other party
claiming benefit of the estoppel at the time when such conduct was done and at
the time when it was acted upon by him." 2 PoiAmaoy, op. cit. supra note 14,
§8o5.
' This theory that ignorance of the law excuses no one originated with Lord
Ellenborough in the case of Bilbie v. Lumley, 2 East 469, 470,472 (1802). Often
it leads to most unfortunate results, but as it seems to be so firmly entrenched in
our jurisprudence we must accept it whether we like it or not. See, however,
WOODWARD, op. cit. supra note 13, ch. III where this question is discussed in
conjunction with the quasi contractual problem of recovering money paid under
a mistake of law. See also note 41 supra.
'The facts of Storrs v. Barker, szapra note 42, are as follows: Defendant,
ignorant of the fact (law) that his daughter, as feme covert, could not devise,
encouraged another to buy land from the devisee. Later he found out that he
was the heir. Held, that h- was estopped to set up his title. See also note 48,
L. R. A. (N. s.) 773 (914).
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result is often a great loss and hardship on the other contractor
who has changed his position in reliance on the validity of the
oral contract. 7 To prevent this from occurring, the plea of
estoppel is here often allowed, despite the absence of the third
element, or, disregarding the fiction of the presumed knowledge
of the law, the second element. Sometimes the Gordian knot is
cut by failing to discuss the misrepresented fact, in some instances
by claiming that it would be fraud to set up the statute after
having led another to rely on the contract.58 It needs no ex-
tended comment to show that in such cases the courts confuse
moral fraud with legal fraud. It is debatable as to whether it
would not be better if the courts, instead of trying to justify
their decisions under this incomplete estoppel, might not frankly
grant relief on the grounds of hardship.59 If it were anything
but estoppel, that would be a very cogent argument, but estoppel
is a constantly expanding doctrine and, as Prof. Pomeroy warns:
"It would be unsafe and misleading to rely on these
general requisites as applicable in every case without examin-
ing the instances in which they have been modified or
limited." 60
Moreover the granting of estoppel in these cases does not
seem to do violence to the broad definition of this principle given
by Prof. Pomeroy:
"Equitable estoppel is the effect of the voluntary conduct
of a party whereby he is absolutely precluded both at law
and in equity from asserting rights which might have existed
either of property, of contract or of remedy, as against
The mischievous result of enforcing the statute strictly is seen in the case
of Sievewright v. Archibald, 17 Q. B. 118, at iig (1886), where Campbell, C. J.,
said: "I regret to say that the view which I take of the law in this case com-
pels me to come to the conclusion that the defendant is entitled to our judg-
ment, although the merits are entirely against him; although believing that he
had broken the contract, he could only have defended his action in the hope of
mitigating the damages; and although he was not aware .of the objection on
which he now relies, till within a few days before the trial."
'See Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, at 35 (1869) for probably the most
widely quoted paragraph in this field of law.
Ordinarily hardship of itself does not take a case out of the statute. See
note (1924) 2 TEX. L. REv. 347. See also the early case of Hollis v. Whiteing,
i Vern. 151 (1682).
' See supra note 33.
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another person, who has in good faith relied upon such con-
duct, and has changed his position for the worse, and who on
his part acquires some corresponding right either of property,
of contract or of remedy." 61
Though Dean Pound calls estoppel "that much enduring word", "
at another time in lamenting the decadence of equity, he cites
estoppel as a conspicuous example of an equitable principle ac-
quiring a legal shell so that "we now regard precedent as at least
of equal weight with the equities of the case in question".63 Can
it not be said that there is a revival of the old idea in these cases?
Especially as in a recent case 64 the following remarks on estoppel
are quoted with approval:
"It is a growing branch of the law, in which decided
cases are of less value than usual, for the reason that every
cause must depend upon its peculiar facts and circumstances."
Casting about for analogies, the closest that can be found is the
case of a corporation estopped to deny the validity of an ultra
vires act even though the other person had constructive notice of
the corporation's charter. In Harris v. Gas Co., 6 the following
comment is made:
"These cases have been criticized for the use they make
of the word 'estoppel' as descriptive of the principle upon
which they are based. It is argued that as a corporation must
know the terms of its own charter and as one dealing with it
must be charged with a like knowledge, neither party to an
ultra vires contract can be misled in that respect and there-
fore there must always be lacking an essential element of
what could with technical accuracy be called an estoppel.
This, however, is a mere question of terminology. The re-
e2 PomERoy, op. cit. suipra note 14, § 804. For other good definitions of
estoppel see Bouvier's Law Dictionary, quoting the United States Supreme Court
in Dickerson v. Colgrove, ioo U. S. 578 at 580 (1879). Note (1915) 28 HARV. L.
Rav. 415 at 423 et seq. carries a short and valuable discussion of estoppel in pais.
The leading treatises on the subject are those of BIGELOW, op. cit. supra note 43,
and EWART, ESTOPPEL (i900). There are also treatises by Caspersz, Chand,
Herman and Van Fleet.
Pound, The Progress of the Law (1920) 33 HARv. L. REv. 929, at 942.
Pound, op. cit. supra note 26, at 33.
Interstate Co. v. Bry Block Manufacturing Co., supra note io.
76 Kan. 750, 753, 92 Pac. 1123, 1124 (1907).
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quirement that one shall be consistent in conduct-shall not
occupy contradictory positions-shall not retain the advan-
tages of a transaction and reject its burdens-is often spoken
of as a form of estoppel. The term is convenient, and if
inaccurate is not misleading. This rule of estoppel affords
a good working hypothesis to accomplish just results."
Precisely the same reasoning is applicable to the cases under dis-
cussion, so that the use of the word estoppel is not as blameworthy
as it may at first appear.
At this point it may be urged that only the very clearest
cases of estoppel should be allowed to overthrow the express letter
of the law, and that by extending the principles of equitable estop-
pel beyond its strict bounds the courts are indulging in judicial
legislation. But applying the usual rules of statutory construction
and looking at the intent of Parliament and the evils that the
statute was supposed to remedy it seems that this argument must
be answered in the negative. To begin with there can be but little
doubt that the statute was passed primarily to curb the power of
the juries. Prof. Costigan even argues that it never was intended
to apply to Chancery and that Chancery accepted it merely because
it wished to follow the law.00 Yet Dean Pound's criticism
of this argument seems valid, namely, that if it had not been in-
tended to apply to equity they should have spoken thus:
"Since with our modes of proof we can obviate the mis-
chiefs of seventeenth century jury trial, for which alone the
statute was devised we will specifically enforce all contracts
written or oral according to the general principles of our
jurisprudence." 67
But had that been the case it is conceivable that suit after suit
would have been brought in Chancery on the pretext that the
legal remedy was inadequate, and a large part of the jurisdiction
of the common law courts would have been cut off. Neither could
equity discard the Statute of Frauds as it did the Statute of Limi-
tations for, in the latter case, equity had always enforced the
M Costigan, Has There Been Judicial Legislation in the Interpretation and
Application of the "Upon Consideration of Marriage" and Other Contract
Clauses of the Statute of Frauds (igig) 14 ILL. L. RFv. i.
' Pound, op. cit. supra note 62, at 936.
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analogous doctrine of laches while there was nothing in equity
similar to the Statute of Frauds. So what Chancery did was to
accept the statute and proceed to engraft exceptions to it; part
performance because transfer of possession had in it the elements
of a common law conveyance, i. e., livery of seisin Il and relief
from fraud on the ground that a statute enacted to prevent fraud
should not be used as an instrument of fraud. This was not
anomalous, inasmuch as the same judges that interpreted the stat-
ute had drafted it, and consequently they were merely interpreting
it as it was meant to be interpreted. In other cases as well, the
court of Chancery, directly after the passage of the statute, tried to
restrict its operation wherever it could. 69  Of course, later on,
harsher decisions were made, precedents crystallized and the origi-
nal purport of the statute was lost sight of. But of recent years
equitable principles have taken on a new lease of life and the rigid-
ity of the nineteenth century decisions has been relaxed,70 so that
these decisions are not necessarily authority today. Thus, when it
is contemplated that the statute is a seventeenth century statute,
and the chief reasons for its enactment are gone, the courts are
justified in going even further than the early courts, by extending
the plea of estoppel to cases where one of the elements is lacking.
As Prof. Costigan points out:
"Since the need of the statute is less today the court, in
a doubtful case, may well restrict the operation of the statute
wherever reasonably possible." 71
And it is very doubtful indeed if it was ever intended that the
statute should work rank injustice.
Objection will at once be made that this is destroying the
wholesome defence of the statute and opening the way to fraud.
To begin with, it is almost inconceivable that anyone should
materially change his position, so as to satisfy all the elements
'The unequivocal act explanation came later and was fully expounded by
the Earl of Selborn in Maddison v. Alderson, L. R. 8 App. Cas. 467 (1883).
See 21 Eng. Reprints 841 (1902), where the cases on the Statute of Frauds
decided up to 1744 are abridged and collected.
"This liberalizing tendency of today has already been discussed mipra
page
2Costigan, op. cit. supra note 66, at 37.
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of an estoppel, on the expectation of recouping himself on a
"framed" contract. Secondly, there is a very serious doubt as to
what protection the statute really does afford. Despite the lofty
words about its glory that are so often pronounced, its protection,
in most cases, is more illusory than real. If a clever scoundrel
does want to "frame" a contract all he has to do is to frame one
without the statute, which is not very hard to do considering the
numerous exceptions to it. Only in the cases of land contracts
will he be balked, and even then if he is really clever, he may sur-
mount this difficulty by alleging a writing and its subsequent loss.
7 2
The many problems revolving around the "fact" element and
its fundamental importance have made it necessary to dwell on
this phase of the subject. Proceeding with the discussion of the
remaining elements, the next in order is the fourth:
"The conduct must be done with the intention or at least
with the expectation that it will be acted upon by the other
party. There are several familiar species in which it is simply
impossible to ascribe any intention or even expectation to the
party estopped, so that his conduct will be acted upon by the
one who afterwards claims the benefit of the estoppel."
However, the Statute of Frauds cases do not fall within these
species for the contract must be represented as binding with the
clear expectation that the other party shall change his position as
a result. For instance: A had a contract to carry mail for the
government for a period of four years. B sub-contracted to carry
it for the remaining time, over one year, and promised to make
a written contract to that effect. B then refused to do so. In the
meantime A, relying on the oral contract had left Susanville,
where he had been operating and sold his horses and rig. But as
B had never known that A was acting in reliance on the contract
and not from other reasons, B was not estopped to deny the
contract, even though A suffered considerable damage, through
"On the subject of lost instruments see: JONES, EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1924)
§214 and n. 96 for examples; 4 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2105 b;
McKELvEY, EViDENCE (3d ed. I924) § 283; I REED, op. cit. supra note 21, § 326
and 3 ibid. § ixoo.
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having to re-settle in Susanville and re-equip himself. 73 An-
other federal court refused to recognize an estoppel (though fully
recognizing the principle 74) under these facts: B, relying on an
oral sale transacted with S, resold the goods which he thought
he had purchased to X, so as to subject himself to liability to X
if S did not consummate the sale and thus in turn enable him
to carry out his agreement with X. The reason that estoppel
was refused was that S, at the time of the making of the contract,
had no intent or expectation that B would change his position by
reselling the goods. These two illustrations serve to show that
the courts are prone to insist on this element being present.
The fifth element does not present any particular difficulties:
"The conduct must be relied upon by the other party,
and thus relying, he must be led to act upon it."
In other words, there must be a bona fide reliance on the
validity of the contract, and it must be clear that the change of
position must have resulted from such reliance and that it was not
caused by extraneous circumstances. Thus where S sold fruit to B
by an enforceable oral contract and S, relying on this contract,
neglected to pick the fruit so that an unforeseen frost killed it, it
was held that there was no estoppel, for if it had not been for the
frost the contract would have been performed. Hence the change
in position was not occasioned by any conduct of B's but by ex-
traneous circumstances. 5
Lastly the sixth element:
"He must in fact act upon it in such a manner as to
change his position for the worse; in other words, he must
'sLong et a. v. Long et al., 162 Cal. 427, 122 Pac. IO77 (i912). This should
be considered a border line case. The court could just as well have decided the
other way. The position of the court assumes a colossal stupidity and lack of
observation on the part of B.
" In Cincinnati Distributing Co. v. Sherwood and Sherwood Commercial
Co., 270 Fed. 82, at 83 (C. C. A. 9th, 1921), it was said: "It is true that a con-
tract may be within the Statute of Frauds, yet if the conduct of the party who
relies upon the statute has been such as to raise an equity outside of and inde-
pendent of the contract, he may be estopped to make that defence."
' In Stowe v. Fay Fruit Co., go Cal. App. 421 at 427, 265 Pac. 1042, at 1045
(1928) the court said: "The freeze of January 19th which caused all the trouble
was a circumstance, of course, utterly apart from the acts of either of the
parties."
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so act that he would suffer a loss if he were compelled to
surrender, to forego or alter what he has done by reason of
the first party being permitted to repudiate his conduct and
to assert rights inconsistent with it."
This means that an actual loss must occur and such loss must be
sufficiently pleaded. Mere change of position is not enough.
The case of Standing v. Morosco is illustrative.76  A, an actor,
was induced by B to give up his employment in New York and
act for B in Los Angeles. The oral contract for employment
was for more than one year so that it was within the statute.
A gave up his position in New York, sold his furniture and
moved with his wife to Los Angeles. Within two and a half
months B dismissed him. It was held that B was not estopped to
deny the oral contract for there was no actual damage shown.
For aught the court knew, A's term of employment in New York
may have been almost over, he might have sold his furniture at a
profit, and settling in Los Angeles may have been highly bene-
ficial. For some reason, quite inexplicable, many courts do not
seem to regard entering into a binding written contract on the
faith of an unenforceable collateral agreement as sufficient dam-
age so as to enforce the latter. A Nevada court refused to raise
estoppel in the following case: A entered into a written agree-
ment with B for the lease of land for a period of five years. Along
with that was a collateral oral agreement that B should provide
A with forty horses every year to till the land. The second year
B refused to go through with this agreement. A on his own
initiative obtained fourteen horses, the most that he could get,
but this number was insufficient to do the work and he suffered
great loss. When he brought suit the court, in an unconvincing
opinion, refused to allow estoppel. 77 It seems obvious that
A would never have entered into a legally binding agreement to
lease without the oral agreement so necessary to the value of the
former, so that the case is somewhat dubious.
7843 Cal. App. 244, 184 Pac. 954 (919).
' Nehls et aL. v. Williams Stock Farming Co., supra note 47. See also
Robbins v. Winters at al., supra note 52. However, in both cases redress would
probably have been denied anyway for the courts refused to find the fact to base
estoppel on. See supra page 454 et seq.
ESTOPPEL AND THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS
It is not contended that in every case where estoppel has been
set up against the Statute of Frauds, all the above mentioned ele-
ments are present. Some courts are more lenient than others,
and in many cases a point will be stretched if a too rigid insistence
might work injustice. But to insure recognition of the plea of
estoppel, every element should be properly presented in the plead-
ings and proof.
CONCLUSION
In summing up, what deductions must be drawn from the
cases? The most noticeable is the gradual change from a rigid
insistence on the letter of the law to the broader ground of in-
sistence on the true spirit of the law, the protection of innocent
parties in their legitimate rights. For this purpose the doctrine
of estoppel is the most powerful of all weapons and, metaphorically
speaking, one that will temper the wind of the Statute of Frauds
to the shorn lamb whether plaintiff or defendant. The un-
derlying vzotif is a desire to extend this doctrine, but it is
as yet not fully developed, so that two courts are liable to
reach diametrically opposite results by varying interpretations
of the same principle. Even when estopped is permitted, the
very adjudication of the matter, though it may favor the in-
nocent party, is cumbersome, laborious and expensive. As has
been many times suggested, it might be well to repeal the statute,
or at least sections four and seventeen, but in view of the immo-
bility of most legislatures when it comes to repealing a law, such
a solution is too much to hope for. However, it is barely possible
that some sort of a compromise agreement might be reached.
For instance, this compromise suggests itself: It would be pos-
sible to revise the statutes to cover in unambiguous terms all
those contracts and claims that, from their importance or from
the distant time of their ultimate performance, justify memo-
randa to record their existence. This is precisely what the present
statute attempts to do. But in this plan the lack of such a memo-
randum would not be conclusive. In a preliminary hearing if it
were decided by the judge that the contract was without the statute
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the trial would proceed as heretofore. If it was decided that the
contract was within the statute and, contrary to present usage,
the contract should be interpreted strictly, the plaintiff must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that such a contract did exist, instead of
proving it by the preponderance of the evidence. In other words,
he would have precisely the same burden of proof that the state
has in a criminal case. Of course it is impossible to know how
such a plan would work in actual practice, but it seems that any-
thing would be better than the present hopeless jumble of contra-
dictory cases that interpret the Statute of Frauds.
